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1. Paintings arc organized objects. That much we know, and, in 
an area where not much is secure, it is worth hanging on to. The or-
ganization of his painting is something of which the painter is to 
some degree aware, and it is something of which he wants- again 
to some degree- the spectator also to be aware. 
Painters are inclined to talk of their paintings as "working" or as 
"not working". Furthermore a painting that at one moment is found 
not to work may, at a later stage, through the ingenuity of the artist, 
or through sheer application, be made to work. It is inviting to think 
that whether a painting works or doesn't work has something to do 
with its organization, and this idea gains support from the fact that it 
is only at a late stage in the creative process that the painter will start 
to think about the painting's working. No serious painter starts out 
with the bare intention of making a a painting that will work: he first 
sets out to make a painting for this or that reason, and then later tries 
to make certain that it will work. 
2. I start with a painting and a piece of criticism. 
The painting is by Picter Brueghel, it hangs in the Vienna museum, 
and it is generally called Christ Carrying tile Cross to Calvm)', oa· 1111' Pro-
r.e.rsion to Calvary (Fig. I). It is dated 1564, and is therefore a work of 
Brueghel's maturity, and it depicts one of the three moments when 
Christ, on his way from prison to execution, accompanied by a large 
and indeterminate body of soldiers, sightseers, hostile citizens, and 
believers, stumbles under the weight of the Cross, which, as an ex-
ceptional punishment, he has been condemned to carry to the place 
where he will be crucified. 
The criticism is by Roger Ft)', the English formalist critic and art-
historian. Fry, by upbringing a Quaker, by training a scientist, brought 
with him from his formation a strong belief in first principles. When 
an argument threatened to lead to an absurd conclusion, he showed 
a powerful disinclination to retrace the absurdity to an exaggeration 
in the premisses. 
I 
The essay of Fry's that I wish to consider is entitled "Some Ques-
tions in Esthetics", and it appears in a volume of essays called 
Transfonnations 1• The essay criticizes Brueghel's painting on general 
grounds, and it fixes on a particular point to drive home his argument. 
The general criticism is that the painting is so cluttered up with undi-
gested detail that the spectator is obliged to crane fonvard in order 
to make out what he is looking at. In doing so, he loses all sense of 
the whole. And, as a flagrant example of what is generally wrong with 
the painting, Fry concentrates on an element that he refers to as 
something that "looks like a black ring": it is be found some way up 
on the right hand side of the painting. Of it Fry says that it lacks "any 
significance in a plastic sense" 2• Nothing, it turns out, could, within 
his scheme of things, be more damning. 
I don't have to say why the element is there, or what it represents. 
You can use your eyes to see it in the picture: a phrase that will recur. 
The black ring represents a crowd of citizens grouped around two un-
occupied crosses. They have presumably risen early, they have made 
their way to the barren hillside outside the city, known as the place 
of the skull, and there they will wait, occasionally jostling for a better 
position, until the procession, which is now making slow and painful 
progress along the foreground of the painting, arrives. When it does, 
the third cross will be set up between the two that are already there, 
and the great event of the day, which is- or so the circle of people 
tells us - something not to be missed, will unfold. What these som-
bre figures do for the overall drama is that they bring into the pre-
sent, so far given over to mere haphazard bullying and abuse, a 
premonition of the suffering and the terror that will be experienced 
for certain in the future. They are, in a critical phrase of yesterday, 
the "objective correlative" to the passion of Christ. 
Now, if Fry uses the phrase "something that looks like a black 
ring" to designate the detail that so offends him, it is not that he has 
failed to recognize its representational role. He is fully aware of it. In-
deed he describes what is represented by it in terms not at all dissimilar 
from those I have just used. Furthermore, on one level, he shares my 
admiration for Brueghel's introduction of the crowd ofbystanders into 
the painting. It is, he says, "a great psychological invention". It sets 
up, he says, "profound vibrations of feeling within us by its poignant 
condensation." He compares it to an invention of Shakespeare's. 
1 Roger Fry, Transfonntllioru: Critiral a11d Speculative Essays on Art (Chatto and Win-
dus: London, 1926). 
2 op. cit. pl5. 
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But ultimately for Fry the black ring, which is how he thinks that 
this part of the painting should be referred to when we are trying to 
evaluate the painting as a painting- is a bad thing. :Judged as a plas-
tic and spatial creation"- that is to say, judged by the standards ap-
propriate to paintings- this detail is "entirely trivial and inexpressive". 
In the very act of rising to the heights of Shakespeare, Brueghel con-
trived to betray his mission as a painter. He has subordinated plastic 
considerations, which should be his true imperatives, to psychologi-
cal considerations, which are irrelevant. 
3. In this passage, Fry tells us that Brueghcl's painting doesn't work. 
And as if in confirmation of the connexion I was suggesting earlier, 
he ascribes its failure to a fault in its organization. And he goes on to 
explain explain why the fault is a fault. In other words, he inserts his 
criticism of a single painting into an overall view of pictorial organi-
zation, into which he compresses a view of what pictorial organization 
is and a view of what it is that makes for pictorial organization. 
The overall view of pictorial organization that Fry produces com-
bines three general principles. 
My names for these principles are, in descending order of gener-
ality, the Principle ofNonnativity (that is the most general), the Prin-
ciple of Purity, and the Principle of Formalism, and a few words on 
each. 
First, there is the Principle of Normativity, and this states that pic-
torial organization is a value: it is something that artists should pur-
sue, it is something that a picture is the better for having. A step 
beyond thinking that a picmre organized is better than a picture not 
organized is to think that there are better and less good ways of or-
ganizing a picture. The principle of Normativity pronounces pictor-
ial organization a nonn, at once for painter and for spectator and critic. 
Secondly, there is the Principle of Purity, and this states that there 
are a number of aspects of a painting that are irrelevant to the orga-
nization of a picture. They have nothing to contribute to pictorial or-
ganization nor do they stand to benefit from it. On Fry's view of the 
matter, which is by no means peculiar to him, these irrelevant aspect.o; 
include (as we have seen) psychological considerations, and also lit-
erary or narrative considerations. The likeliest thing that such con-
siderations can do is to distract the artist from the problems of 
organization through involving him in what Fry· disparagingly calls 
"illustration": consider Brueghel and the crowd of sightseers. The 
Principle of Purity in effect quarantines the organization of the paint-
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ing, and so, by extension, the painting itself, from issues of direct 
human interest. 
Finally, there is the Principle of Formalism, which states that the 
organization of a picture is always a matter of the arrangement of, or 
the interrelations between, elements, or units, into which the paint-
ing may be segmented. The favoured name for such elements is 
"form". There arc various views about what a form is, or how forms 
are to be identified. Some Formalists, including Fry, think that the el-
ements into which a picture can be resolved arc units that lie on the 
surface, where a sensitive critic will discern them. Others, also Formalists, 
think that the units of organization, which they often misleadingly call 
the syntax of the painting, lie below the surface, from which they have 
to be retrieved in special ways reminiscent of grammatical parsing. 
4. I shall now consider these principles in ascending order of gen-
erality, starting with the Principle of Formalism, and specifically with 
the version in which Fry subscribed to it: that is, that the organiza-
tional units, out of which pictures are composed, lie on the pictor-
ial surface. Perhaps not everyone may spot them immediately, but there 
they are. 
However the Principle of Formalism is of little use to us unless we 
have a settled way of picking out the forms of a picture. We need a 
way of doing it for ourselves, and then we shall need assurance that, 
once we have done this, we- and "we" is now a community of spec-
tators - have all done the same thing. 
A solution to this difficulty would be to develop an operational un-
derstanding of the notion of form. We should try to come up with a 
process, a physical process, by means of which we can, in the presence 
of a picture, extract the forms from its surface. 
One suggestion how this might be done is that, standing in front 
of a painting, say of the Brueghel, we should put, or we should imag-
ine ourselves putting, a sheet of plain glass O\'er or parallel to its sur-
face. The glass completely covers the surface, and it is placed in such 
a way that our line of vision passes through its centre, and at right an-
gles to it. We look through the glass, and then we trace on to the glass 
all the lines that can be seen through it, and, somewhat unrealistically, 
it must be assumed that we can do this without moving our heads. The 
task completed, we are to remove the glass, and, as we lift it off, we 
find, inscribed on the glass, a total record of the forms of the picture, 
and hence, once we have noted how the forms are interrelated, a record 
of its organization, such as it is. 
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Where this suggestion comes from is clear enough. It comes out 
ofthe processes devised by thinkers of the Renaissance, at once to ex-
hibit the theory, and to facilitate the practical application, of perspective, 
or coslmzione kgittima. An example is Durer's "gate". In effect, the pre-
sent suggestion proposes that the process of extracting the organiza-
tion from a picture is a reiteration of that very process initially used 
by the artist to extract the picture itself from Nature. 
Now, straightforward though the proposal may sound, there arc 
very real difficulties with it. They need to be confronted. 
5. As we start to draw on the glass, we shall, from time to time, 
find ourselves asking ourselves one or other of the following questions, 
Should we not at this poilll draw in a line, because, though none is 
visible through the glass, certain forms - that is, what we can inde-
pendently recognize as certain forms- will otherwise go unrecorded? 
Alternatively, Is there not here a line that, though it is visible through 
the glass, we should not draw in, because it docs not describe, or help 
to describe, what we can independently recognize as a form? So, 
standing in front of the Brucghel, with the glass in place, we arc 
about to trace on it the lines that indicate the singular thorns in 
Christ's crown. Should we do so, or will that record a form where there 
is no form? Next, our attention turns to the clouds. Surely here there 
are forms, the forms of the clouds. Yet here and there Brucghel pro-
vides no line: rather he allows the douds to blend, or merge, into the 
blue of the firmament. So do we not need, for the sake of complete-
ness, to insert a line around them? 
It goes without saying that it would be a serious matter if a proc-
ess that was introduced for its operational value, like Durer's gate, 
turned out to be plagued with difficulties of application. 
6. These last problems arise only because Brueghel's painting is 
not in a fully linear style. \Nhcn a painting is not in a fully linear style, 
and most are not, the pictorial surface will under-determine, or it will 
give insufficient specification, which lines are to be inscribed on the 
glass. 
But there is a filrther problem. For, even when it ha<> been resolved 
how the glass is to be marked, the question arises, How are to look at 
the glass, with its lines, with its marks, if it is to serve us as a true record 
of the forms that the picture contains? 
An obvious suggestion is that we should see the lines as constitut-
ing a flat or two-dimensional pattern on the surface of the glass. This 
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suggestion takes up on what was presumably the rationale for ever think-
ing of the sheet of glass as an adequate process for extracting form 
from painting. For, given that what the glass does best is to reproduce 
with great fidelity a flat or tw<HI.imensional pattern lying on the pic-
torial surface, the original thought must have been that the organi-
zation of the picture is itself something flat or in two dimensions. 
But to this obvious suggestion there is a powerful objection, which 
incidentally would have found some support from Fry himself. It is 
that, since we do not ordinarily look at a painting as a flat or tw<HI.i-
mensional surface, it is implausible that pictorial organization, which 
is the core of a painting, should be in the flat or two dimensional. What 
this objection reminds us of is the all-important fact that, unless we 
are othenvise manipulated by the artist, we bring to bear upon a 
painting a special mode of perception, which I call "seeing-in".3 This 
mode of perception is not unique to looking at pictures, and, just for 
this reason, it can be used to explain certain features of our pictorial 
experience. 
Seeing-in is likely to be triggered by looking at a marked surface 
of any real complexity, and what is characteristic of seeing-in is its par-
ticular phenomenology, or what the experiences to which it gives rise 
are like for the observer who has them. When we see something in a 
surface, we simultaneously notice the way the surface is marked and 
are made visually aware of something in front of, or behind, some-
thing else. So we look at a wall stained by dirt and damp, like the wall 
photographed in Chicago by Aaron Siskind (Fig. 2), and, as well as 
taking in the textured surface, we see a boy carrying a mysterious box. 
Or we look at a frosted pane of glass like that photographed by Minor 
White, and, as well as taking in the textured surface, we see dancers 
in gauze dresses. And, in doing this, we manifestly do not look at the 
marked surface as a flat pattern. 
Seeing-in is prior to painting both logically and historically. Log-
ically, in that we can things in surfaces that neither are, nor are 
thought by us to be, paintings: historically, in that our ancestors must 
have engaged in these activities long before they decorated the caves 
in which they lived with the images of the animals they hunted. How-
ever, when seeing-in is taken up into painting, a major change occurs. 
Seeing-in acquires a criterion of correctness. When we look at a paint-
3 See Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art: tht Andmu \V. Mellon L«tum in tht Fine 
Arts for 1984 (Princeton University Press: Princeton NJ, 1986), Lecture II, and ~on Pic-
torial Representation w,journal of Aesthetics am/ Art Criticism, Volume 56, number 3, Sum· 
mer 1998, pp.217-226. 
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ing, there are certain things that can be correctly seen in it, and what-
ever else we might see in it is incorrectly seen in it. When we look at 
a certain sixteenth-century portrait, we correctly see in its surface 
Henry VIII of England, and, if, being old film buffs, we see Charles 
Laughton in it, we have made a mistake. When Proust went to the Lou-
vre, and saw in the Ghirlandaio double portrait, not an old Italian 
prelate with a polyp at the end of his nose, but his friend from the 
Faubourg, the genial Marquis de Lau, he too made a mistake: the dif-
ference here is that he set out to do so. By contra-;t, in the case of stained 
walls, or frosted panes of glass, anything can be seen in them with equal 
legitimacy. There is no room for a mistake. 
A question to ask is, What is the ground, or source, of the crite-
rion of correctness that seeing-in gains for itself when it is tied to the 
intentional activity of painting? 
It is my view that this criterion is provided for each painting by the 
intention, more specifically by the fulfilled intention, of the artist. What 
we see in a picture is something that it is correct to see there when it 
concurs with the fulfilled intention of the artist. But this is not, I 
stress, the only view of the standard of correctness, and, for our pre-
sent purposes, it suffices to recognize that there is such a standard. 
I return to the dependence of painting, of representational paint-
ing, upon seeing-in, and its scope. When we something in a marked 
surace, we are not confined to seeing in this surface things like boys 
and dancers, mysterious boxes and gauze dresses: we can equally see 
solid shapes and floating patches of colour. In consequence, when paint-
ing derives from seeing-in, it can assume either of two forms: it can 
be either figurative or abstract, and the history of art has borne this 
out. Since both kinds of painting invoke a form of looking that leads 
us, while remaining aware of the marked surface before our eyes, to 
see one thing in front of, or behind, another, the figurative/abstract 
distinction is best regarded as marking a difference within the rep-
resentational: the concept of representation finding its unity in its 
dependence upon seeing-in. 
I go back then to the objection to looking at the marked sheet of 
glass as giving us a record of a two-dimensional pattern, which in turn 
is the organization of the painting that lies the other side ofthe glass. 
We can now strengthen it like this: Given that when we look at paint-
ings, our looking at them leads us to see what we can see in them, it 
is deeply implausible that their organization should be captured in 
something that we are supposed to see another way, or that requires 
us to inhibit seeing-in. Of course, what is drawn on the sheet of glass 
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is a two-dimensional pattern: that goes without saying. But that it 
should be seen as such is another matter. 
7. However, once we recognize that the sheet of glass \\ith its trac-
ings has no hope of giving us the organization of a picture unless we 
look at it with the express aim of seeing what we can see in it, we might 
start to ask, Does the sheet of glass, docs Durer's gate, give us the best 
operationalist understanding of form? For all that this procedure 
gives us as its output are lines, and, when we see something in a pic-
ture, we normally depend on something more than lines. So we might 
go on to wonder whether a better process might not be the follow-
ing: By use of the relevant projective system, or that employed by the 
artist, we derive from the pictorial surface, either in reality or in imag-
ination, a groundplan that corresponds to the picture. Then, on this 
groundplan, we construct a three-dimensional model of the represented 
scene, and it is this model that gives us the forms whose interrelations 
constitute the organization of the picture. 
But this suggestion, taken literally, has one highly paradoxical 
consequence. For it follows that all paintings that depict the same scene 
but in different conditions, or from different points of view, have the 
same organization. The notions of form, and of pictorial organization, 
seem again derailed. 
To forestall this consequence, it looks as though all that is needed 
is a simple addition. What we need to add is a sight-line, or a perspective. 
The forms of a painting are such and such three-dimensional objects 
seen from such-and-such a poir1t of view, or culling rucll-cmd-such profiles, 
or occluding such-and-such a sjJace. These are intended to be equivalent 
formulations. 
But this new suggestion as to how to extract the forms, hence the 
organization, from a painting presents problems of an order that 
were not to be anticipated so long as the organization of the paint-
ing was held to be something two-dimensional, or the favoured op-
eration for arriving at this record was the plane sheet of glass placed 
over the painting. 
Initially there are the problems of under-determination, or the mul-
tiple ways in which the relevant marks on the surface fail to determine 
how the organization of the picture is to be recorded. 
Under-determination is something we have already encountered 
when (one) the organization of the painting was thought to be some-
thing two-dimensional, and (two) the painting fell short of total lin-
earity. However, when the organization of the painting is recognized 
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to be three-dimensional, the possibilities of under-determination mas-
sively enlarge. In addition to the case where the painting is less than 
fully linear, there are those cases where, for instance, there is more 
than one projective system in usc - as in the Giottesque The Vision 
of Thrones at Assissi, where oblique projection in the upper, or heav-
enly, register is contrasted with perspective in the lower, ortcrrestrial, 
register- or where there is just one projective system, but there are 
changing viewpoints- as in Matisse's Interior at Nice, of 1921, or in 
the Nympheas of Monet, where the foreground of the scene is looked 
sharply down upon and through as from above. 
However further rcflexion suggests that, when pictorial organiza-
tion is thought of three-dimensionally, or in terms of what we can see 
in the picture, the very idea of under-determination by the relevant 
marks on the surface, or, more precisely, the very idea of the relevant 
marks on the surface, becomes problematic. For now there is no clear 
way of ruling out, at any mte in advance, any aspect of the painting 
on the grounds that it does not contribute to what we sec in it, hence 
that it does not contribute to iLo; organization. Over and above con-
tour, which was all that pao;scd through Durer's gate, there are all those 
undelimitable aspects of the paint-surface that represent, or reveal, 
or intimate, the effects of light as they model, or obscure, or dissolve, 
volume, and each ofthem has therefore some claim to be counted as 
formal, or to be included in any record of the forms into which the 
painting can be analyzed. 
With a question mark over the Principle of Formalism, I am ready 
to turn to the other two principles, the Principle of Purity and the Prin-
ciple of Normativity. And I shall consider them in relation to the 
broad notion of pictorial organization, where this is now freed from any 
neceuary connexion with Formalism. Mter all, there are many different 
ways of organizing a picture, of which the arrangement of constituent 
forms is only one. 
8. So, the Principle of Purity. 
This principle asserts the mutual independence of pictorial or-
ganization and subject-matter, both ways round. Neither depends on 
the other. For many devotees of the arts, it has the appeal of auster-
ity. However it certainly flies in the face of every pictorial tradition 
we know. Painters, in organizing their paintings, have drawn on sub-
ject-matter, and, in developing their subject-matter, they have made 
use of organization. And, since this is what painters have done, and 
-far more important- much of the interest of their work has de-
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pended on it, it is difficult to see what prevents that from concluding 
the matter. 
I pick out two paintings for very disparate reasons, both of which 
illustrate the two-way street. The first painting is Raphael's The Expulsion 
of Heliodorus {Fig. 3). It is in the Vatican, and it shows the punishment 
wreaked on the Syrian general Heliodorus when he tried to despoil 
the Temple in Jerusalem of the money belonging to the widows and 
orphans. A heavenly rider descended, and trampled the robber un-
derfoot, while two men flogged his battered body. I have chosen 111e 
Expulsion of Heliodorus because there is in existence a remarkable anal-
ysis of this painting, which makes the point that I wish to make more 
forcefully, and more subtly, than I could ever hope to do, and this anal-
ysis is by the most distinguished critic ever to think of himself as a For-
malist, the great Swiss art-historian Heinrich Wolffiin.4 Evidently 
there are Formalists and Formalists. 
I select two ofWolffiin's observations. They read like throw-away 
obsevations, but they have been carefully studied. Both are about an 
odd element in the picture: the two boys who can be seen climbing 
up the column at the back of the Temple. The first observation goes 
from organization to subject-matter. Wolfflin observes how the boys' 
upward movement counterbalances the prone position ofHeliodorus. 
"The scales" he says," are tipped down on the one side and rise on 
the other". And this formal contrast, he goes on to say, gives "r~al mean-
ing" to the prostration ofHeliodorus. He is not just down, but he will 
not get up the next moment He is down forever. Wolffiin's second 
observation picks out another function that the representation of the 
boys perform, also interrelating form and content. But this time the 
observation takes us, at least initially, from subject-matter to organi-
zation. The climbing motion of the boys, he points out, serves to lead 
the eye backward into the picture, towards the comparative void in 
the centre. If we missed this organizational element, we should also 
miss- and now we are being taken back from organization to subject-
matter - the significance of the High Priest, who is , according to 
Wolffiin, the expressive heart of the work. "The basic theme of im-
ploring helplessness" Wolffiin tells us, "is central in the composition." 
The second painting that I have chosen to illustrate the inter-
weaving of subject-matter and organization, Terborch's The Patemal 
Admonition {Fig. 4), does so, not, as with The Expulsion of Heliodorus, 
4 Heinrich Wolffiin, Classic Arl: an ltroductiun to the Italian Rn1aissance, trans. Peter 
and Linda Murray (Phaidon Press: London, 1963), pp 101-103. 
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on the local, but on the global, level. For it shows how, when our over-
all view of the subject-matter of a painting changes, so too docs our 
perception of its organization. 
When Goethe introduced this painting into his great sombre novel, 
Electiue Affinities, it figures there as one of three paintings that the flir-
tatious Luciana stages as a tab!Rau mutml in order to while away the hours 
of boredom in her aunt's castle. As to its subject-matter, Goethe, and 
Luciana, he in the way he wrote her scenario, she in the way she en-
acted it, had no doubLo; whatsoever about its representational content. 
It depicted a modest young girl, approaching womanhood, about to 
be admonished for a minor fault by her noble, knightly-looking f~l­
ther, while her mother conceals her slight awkwardness behind her 
glass of wine. You can all sec the scene, and you will allow the eye to 
divide up the picture accordingly. The girl, who has turned away to 
spare us her embarrassment, faces a tribunal of mother and father: 
the father more exigent, the mother more withdrawn, more hesitant. 
Modern scholarship disagrees with all this. It maintains that Goethe 
made an egregious mistake about what the picture represents, or 
what is to be seen in it. The scene is a brothel, the noble knight is an 
eager client, the awkward mother is the beady-eyed madame of the 
house, and with her back to us is an aspirant young whore who forces 
up the bidding for her favours. Accept this interpretation, and, with 
the change in the narrative that unfolds, there is a corresponding 
change in the pictorial organization. The client, now sandwiched be-
tween the two inhabita.nts of the brothel, is isolated against the dark 
ground. For the young girl, who still turns away from us, but no longer 
in modesty, or to mask from us the gentle expression that passes 
across her f~tce, but now to conceal something that we do not wish to 
see, pairs ofT with the old woman who sits across from her. One is in 
effect the shrunken mirror image of the other. The young girl's pre-
sent is the old woman's past, and the old woman's present is the 
young girl's future. The old woman averLo; her eyes from what she once 
was, the young woman will not allow us to sec how much she recog-
nizes what she will become. 
9. I turn now to the Principle ofNormativity. 
On one level, this principle must be unobjectionable. It must be 
right to think that pictorial organization is a good thing, and a picture 
is better for being organized. It must be right to think that organiza-
tion is something that an artist should pursue. And it cannot be alto-
gether wrong to think that there are different ways of organizing a 
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picture, and, though they all bring some value with them, some are 
more valuable than others. 
However there are dangers connected with the Principle of Nor-
mativity, of which I wish to consider two. One is a misapprehension 
about the relationship of a painting to its organization. The other is 
a failure to recognize that, there are, not merely different ways of or-
ganizing a painting - indeed every painting may be said to be dif-
ferently organized - but there are different modes, or grades, of 
pictorial organization. 
First, then, how a painting stands to its organization. 
The danger I have in mind arises when, influenced by those fa-
miliar diagrams of great paintings which we find in manual of art ap-
preciation, we start to think of the organization of a painting as 
something that can be separately identified, and that can somehow 
be bodily extricated from the physical context of the painting, and 
held up for public demonstration. 
It is worth emphasizing tl1at this transcendent way of understanding 
pictorial organization is not bound up with any one particular pro-
cedure for abstracting the organization of a picture from the picture. 
It is not, for instance, bound up with the procedure we considered 
earlier of placing a sheet of plane glass over the picture, and tracing 
the outlines of the forms on the glass. Indeed thinking about pictor-
ial organization in an objectionable way does not require that we 
think of pictorial organization in terms of form. This point can be seen 
when we realize that the various diagrammatic representations of 
paintings that I have illustrated we have been looking at have been 
arrived through different operations. The first diagram - Degas's 
Cotton Exchange (Figs. 5, 6) -was arrived by something equivalent to 
the Durer gate: the second- Ingres's La Source (Figs. 7, 8) -was ar-
rived at by tracing- do not ask how -the movements of the eye as 
it wanders across the surface of the work: and the third- Crivelli's 
Crucifixion (Figs. 9, 10) -is the product of some more intuitive 
method of capturing the dynamics of the work. We can see this when, 
in the last case, we substitute for the operation actually used the op-
eration that has taken up so much of this lecture (Fig. 1 I). 
Now, if it really were possible to gut in the way suggested the heart 
of a painting and capture it in a diagram, a remarkable conclusion 
would follow. That is that, if we were then to pair diagram and paint-
ing, the diagram would explain the interest, the value, of the paint-
ing. We would admire the painting because it is the fleshed-out 
diagram, and we would hold that the fleshing-out itself makes small 
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contribution to the value of the painting. 
If it is now said that there is no harm in thinking this, only so long 
as the diagram is complex enough, we are back on the same slippery 
slope that we tried to negotiate in connexion with form. For, short of 
absorbing into itself the totality of the picture, there is no point at 
which the diagram can be assured of claiming sufficiency for itself as 
an explanation of the interest that the painting holds for us. 
And yet this conclusion of mine will seem excessively dismissive to 
some. For there \\ill be those, even amongst the readers of this lec-
ture, who will claim that they learnt to appreciate paintings through 
a study of diagrams of just the sort that I have been suggesting are worth-
less. Arc they deceiving themselves? I suggest an analogy. 
We are, let us imagine, standing in a gallery in front of a painting 
that, for some reason or other, we have done too little to get to know. 
On either side of us are friends, friends who have worked harder at 
the painting than we have. Theywam to get us to see something that 
we haven't. Their hands move. Their fingers trace in the air arabesques, 
and diagonals, and rhyming shapes, sometimes following lines in-
scribed on the two-dimensional surface of the picture, sometimes jab-
bing into the third dimension as this is to be seen in the flat surface. 
All the while their fingers move only a trifle above the surface of the 
painting. 
My suggestion then is that the diabrram is the analogue to tl1e mov-
ing fingers of our friends as they work for our benefit. If we accept 
this, then it would seem to follow that the diagram has a use, just as 
the fingers have a usc, only in combination with the picture. The pic-
ture is needed for the diagram to do something for us. The diagram 
in isolation is useful only if we are blessed with such powers of inter-
nal imagery that we can visualize the picture while we have only the 
diagram to look at, or we can visualize the diagram next time we see 
the picture. 
I turn now to the second danger connected with the Principle of 
Normativity, and that is the failure to recognize that there are differ-
ent modes, or grades, of pictorial organization. I believe that we can 
fruitfully distinguish three. 
The lowest grade of pictorial organization is just that: it is a mat-
ter of finding a place for everything that the painter wants to intro-
duce into the painting. It is a form of good housekeeping. In this 
respect, pictorial organization is inseparable from painting itself, 
every painter is necessarily an organizer in this mode, but it achieves 
prominence at either end of a certain spectrum. It achieves promi-
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nence within archaic or tribal, art, or art of a certain unworldliness, 
where the sense of orientation, or there being a right and a wrong 
way up, perhaps even the sense of there being a bounded surface, have 
not been established, and it achieves prominence again within an art, 
like northern Mannerism, of such extreme worldliness that it wishes 
at all costs not to place things in the most anticipated place. On this 
bottom grade, we think of paintings as organized or not, or possibly 
as more or less organized, but we have as yet no reason to think of 
them as well or ill organized. 
It is only at the second grade of pictorial organization, which is in­
cidentally that which we are likeliest to think of when we think about 
how paintings are organized, that thoughts of good organization ver­
sus bad organization arise. This is because pictorial organization is now 
undertaken for some value that it will secure for the painting. But what 
is distinctive, indeed definitive, of this second grade of organization 
is the kind of value that it aims at: it aims at what we might call an "or­
ganizational value". By this I mean that it aims at a value that can only 
be elucidated by reference to organization itself. Examples of such 
values would be order, harmony, symmetry, proportion, balance, ten­
sion of opposites. When any such value is intentionally realized, I say 
that the painting displays "good" organization, where "good" goes into 
inverted commas. 
Pictorial organization of this second grade was the great achieve­
ment of the painting of Central Italy and the Netherlands in the cen­
tury that included the last three quarters of the fifteenth century and 
the first quarter of the sixteenth century. Later ages have admired it 
immeasurably, but they have less often pursued it. 
This second grade of pictorial organization is the locus of deep, 
but widely unrecognized, confusion. Consider once again Roger Fry. 
For Fry, having established to his satisfaction that the essence of a paint­
ing lies in the interrelations between the forms of which it is consti­
tuted, concludes, without recognizing that this is a further step to his 
argument, that it lies in the hannonious relations between the forms. 
In organizing his painting, the painter, Fry tells us, strives after har­
mony. But two questions are thereby begged. The first is whether the 
painter pursues an organizational value: the second is which orga­
nizational value he pursues. 
The final grade of pictorial organization is undertaken when the 
painter successfully arranges his painting so as to advance some fur­
ther end, and this end is not one to be understood through the na­
ture of organization itself: is some end internal to what the artist 
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hopes to achieve in, or through, his painting. What is important to 
see is that, not merely do most of the most interesting paintings aim 
at this third grade of pictorial organization, but this grade can - can, 
I emphasize, nothing stronger- be realized without any concern for, 
and sometimes in defiance of, the second grade. A painting can be 
brilliantly organized for the fulfillment of the painter's own ends, which 
may themselves be highly pictorial, without cultivating, without even 
exhibiting, "good" organization. 
One thing to do at this moment would be to return to Christ Car­
rying the Cross to Calvary, and to point out how, in all but submerging 
the Gospel story in the disorganized mellee of figures, Brueghel is or­
ganizing his pain ting in his own way to express his own sense of that 
common humanity, in which Christ, and Christ's followers, and Christ's 
tormentors, share in alike. In point of fact, one extremely interesting 
thing about Brueghel's arrangement of the elements is that, however 
much he relaxes the demands of spatial unity, he keeps a strong hold 
on the temporal unity of the picture as is to be observed in the way 
he binds together the successive parts of Christ's cortege as he deftly 
threads it through the mass of confused citizenry. But, to make my 
point, I turn instead to another great painting and another great 
Northern painter, both less well-known: The Castle of Egmont by Jacob 
Ruisdael (Fig. 12). 
10. Look at The Castle of Egmont, and you will see straight off two
things about it. 
In the first place, you will receive the very powerful impression of 
an organized object. Ruisdael seems to have got the parts as he wanted 
them, and he seems to have put them together as he wanted to. But 
- and this is the second thing to be observed - the painting is just
as surely without that form of organization which I am calling "good"
organization: its organization does not seem to realize an organiza­
tional value. On the contrary, The Castle of Egmont sits on the canvas
in a peculiarly lopsided way. Those who are unconvinced - and great
paintings that dispense with good organization persistently obfuscate
this fact - might choose to draw a line down the middle of the can­
vas, and they will observe that everything that is of immediate inter­
est, or that commands our attention, lies one side of that line. The
great rose-red ruins of the castle, even more superb in decline, stand
there, and, on the right side, there is minor detail. Once we recog­
nize these two facts, we seem driven either to re-evaluate the paint­
ing or to use our eyes to see what might justify the grave asymmetry.
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So the eye goes searching in the right hand part of the picture to 
find something that, without rectifYing the imbalance, will somehow 
make up for it. If the eye resists initial discouragement, and persists, 
what it will unearth is a small jewelled scene consisting of a timbered 
cottage, sheep, a shepherd, flowers, and a pool whose surface is pat-
terned with dark mysterious reflections. The scene has a complete-
ness and a lack of drama that painting learnt from Giorgione. Does 
this hold its own with the castle and its stormy setting? In organiza-
tional terms, is the asymmetry justified? 
Clearly Ruisdael thought so, and whether the spectator also does 
depends, I should say, on whether or not he can accept the revela-
tion that small things can be as interesting as big things, and that un-
interesting things can be as poignant as interesting things. It depends 
on whether things that the spectator finds out, or, more precisely, can 
have the sense that he has found out, for himself can have the same 
weight as things to which his attention has been directed. 
To make my point, I bring forward another painting that hangs 
in the obscurity of a nearby room in the same museum, and which, 
when I first saw it, made me think back to The Castle of Egrmmt. It too 
is organized with scant concern for "good" organization. It has the 
same lopsided arrangement as The Castle of Egnumt. But this second 
painting, which is called Antonia Re.ding (Fig. 13), and is by the bravura 
painter, Antonio Mancini, doesn't "work". But the reason for its not 
working is not that it lacks "good" organization. It doesn't work, I should 
say, because the rationale ofits "bad" organization, ofits lopsidedness, 
betrays a certain banality of mind. 
Unlike Ruisdael, Mancini does nothing to encourage the eye to 
move into the right-hand side of his painting. On the contrary, he would 
as soon that it remained under the spell of Antonia's body, which dom-
inates the left-hand side of the picture. If the spell is momentarily bro-
ken, and the eye wanders to the right, Mancini has seen to it that it 
will go visually unrewarded, and will be forced to return to its start-
ing-point. In other words, Mancini is fully prepared to waste one half 
of his canvas, loading it wid1 triviality, in order to ensure that the other 
half retains its relentless pull. Surely a highly talented artist, which 
Mancini was, could have found a more telling way of celebrating the 
power of sexuality than by revealing it as triumphant over boredom: 
the erotic deserves a worthier rival. 
11. But this is not to say that Ruisdael's way of organizing his paint-
ing docs not also raise questions. It does. I have said that, if we let our 
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eyes loose on the canvas, they will start to probe into the right-hand 
side, and, when they do, they will come up with things that we would 
otherwise never have noticed. But, after all, whatever the eye finds arc 
all things that Ruisdacl put there, so would it not have been better if 
Ruisdael had used a more orderly form of organization, and allowed 
the particularities of this dark, northern idyll to be discovered with-
out any painstaking exploration of the picture? 
To answer the question, we arc brought hack, ao; we always arc when 
the the picture is organized in any way that departs from good orga-
nization, to the artist's ends in so far as these go beyond formal or-
ganization. The answer in this particular case lies, I suggest, in whatever 
value there is in rewarding only the eye whose curiosity has been 
aroused. In this way, Ruisdael puts the spectator's eye, the eye that re-
ceives and takes in, on a par with the artist's eye, the eye that discov-
ers and arranges. Ruisdacl arranges the countryside to celebrate the 
very virtue for the cultivation of which a more teleologically minded 
age might very well have thought God had invented the landscape: 
visual curiosity, visual devotion. 
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